A theory of the Law and Policy of Intellectual Property - Building a New Framework by Tamura, Yoshiyuki & Lee, Nari
 Nordic Journal of Commercial Law 
issue 2009#1 
 
A theory of the Law and Policy of Intellectual Property  
- Building a New Framework 
by Yoshiyuki Tamura* translated** to English by Nari Lee 
 
 
*  The 21st Century COE Program “The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property: Building a New Global 
Framework” is a research project that lasted for 5 years until March 2008. This article is an attempt to sum up the 
project achievements and research findings so far. As the project leader, the author gratefully acknowledges all the 
cooperation and supports that the project received in various forms during the last five years. 
** This article has been first published in Japanese as Yoshiyuki Tamura, Chitekizaisan Hōseisakugaku no 
Kokoromi, 20 Chitekizaisan Hōseisakugaku Kenkyu [hereinafter ‘Intell. Prop. L. & Pol’y J.’] 1 (2008). In the course 
of translation into English, the author and the translator removed some footnotes that cite Japanese sources. Please 
see the original Japanese version with full Japanese citations, at 
http://www.juris.hokudai.ac.jp/coe/pressinfo/journal/vol_20/20_1.pdf. 
Nordic Journal of Commercial Law
issue 2009#1
2
1. Justification for Intellectual Property Rights
1.1 Natural Rights Theory Versus Incentive Theory
Two conflicting theories explain and justify the foundation of intellectual property.1 At  one
extreme, natural rights theory justifies the foundation of intellectual property rights to be based
on the natural right that originates from the act of creation, as one owns one’s own creation. At
the other end of spectrum is the theory that allowing free-riding by the second runner who
imitates would give the second runner an excessive advantage and provides a disincentive to the
creator  who invested  in  the  intellectual  creation  as  the  first  runner.  Incentive  theory  explains
that intellectual property is founded to prevent this free riding.
1.2 Two Strands of Natural Rights Theory
1.2.1 Lockean Labour Based Theory of Property
One strand of natural rights theory is based on Lockean labour theory of property, which claims
that a person is entitled to own the fruits of his labour. However, the Lockean theory premises
on the existence of the nature which the God has given to humans in common. The usage of
the resources that becomes separated from the nature before it gets spoiled is justified. The
spoilage justifies the claims of property on this fruits of one’s labour does not require consents
from the others of the community.2 This aspect differs in intellectual property. As intellectual
property is intangible and cannot be reduced to possession unlike the tangibles, intellectual
property can be used without excluding the others. Further the spoilage does not exist in the
intangibles. Thus, intellectual property starts from a different premise.
In addition, Lockean labour based property theory starts from the point that one holds a
property right over ones own body(person), and as a corollary, one owns a property rights over
ones labour and the fruits of the labour belongs to the same person. However, a flip side of the
1 See Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 617, 623-624
(Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet eds., 2003). See also ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL,  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE
NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 2-24 (4th ed., 2006). For a more detailed philosophical analysis, see PETER DRAHOS, A
PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1996); Li Yang (Translated to Japanese by Jin Xun), Chitekizaisanken no
Kan’nen ni tsuite: H?teishugi oyobi sono Tekiy? [The concept of IPR: The Numerus Clausus and its application], 12 Intell.
Prop. L. & Pol’y J. 35, 44-65 (2006).
2 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 286, 288-289 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988) (1698), Drahos, supra
note 1, at 43.
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principle of owning one’s own person is that one cannot claim a right over other persons.3 If
that is the case, intellectual property right becomes unacceptable, as intellectual property right is
a right that directly restricts other persons freedom of action and to justify this right based on
the labour based property theory becomes internally contradictory. Therefore, it is difficult to
justify the foundation of intellectual property with labour based property theory.4
1.2.2 Hegelian Thesis of “Mental Property” (geistiges Eigentum)
Another strand of natural rights based theory is the personality thesis that intellectual property
protection is based on the personal rights of the creator.5 This is based on the Hegelian thesis
(G. W. F. Hegel) who argues that authors own the expression of their will of freedom and the
authors need to retain title over this even after the assignment of the tangibles (i.e. book) that
embody  the  will.  He  further  supplements  this  argument  with  the  consideration  of  the  users’
liberty by arguing that this mental property will lead to the progress of science and arts, and that
the act of borrowing the substance of creation is permissible as long as it is not a verbatim
copying of the creation.6
In general, Hegel acknowledges a property right to be based on the expression of the free will.
This is because of the fact that persons possessing free will in mental world still need to live in
the  external  physical  worlds,  they  need  to  make  decisions  in  the  external  worlds.  A  property
right can be understood as the first concretization of this free will, to claim that the external
world as one’s own.7 From this, a property right needs to be recognised as a reflection of free
3 LOCKE, supra note 2, at 287-288; DRAHOS, supra note 1, at 43-44.
4 SUSUMU MORIMURA, LOCKE SHOY?RON NO SAISEI [REVITALIZING LOCKEAN THEORY OF PROPERTY] 121,
241-261 (1997). For an application of the Lockean proviso to limit the scope of copyright, see Gordon, supra note
1 at 11-12, and see also Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural
Law of Intellectual Property, 102 Yale. L. J. 1533, 1538-39, 1556-72 (1993). See also Yoshiyuki Tamura, Efficiency,
Diversity  and  Freedom  -  Challenges  to  the  Copyright  Institution  Facing  the  Internet  Age, in 9
TEOLLISOIKEUDELLISIA KIRJOITUKSIA 43 (Katariina Sorvari ed., 2008).
5 On the development of mental property theory, see for example, HEINRICH HUBMANN, DAS RECHT DES
SCHÖPFERISCHEN GEISTES 70-71 (1954). In general, mental property theory is distinguished from personality right
and is contrasted to it. See DRAHOS, supra note 1, at 80, for the discussion on the right of the authors, contrasting
the  theories  of  Kant  and  Hegel.  However,  if  one  takes  the  view  that  the  use  of  ownership  is  not  a  legislative
technique but related to the origin of the protection, Hegel’s theory may be contrasted to the labour based
property theory that is based on the act of creation, as Hegel starts from the free will of a person.
6 G. W. F. HEGEL,  PHILOSOPHIE DES RECHTS NACH DER VORLESUNGSNACHSCHRIFT K. G. V. GRIESHEIMS
1824/25 209-211, 230-238, 240 (Karl-Heinz Ilting ed., 1974).
7 Id. at 238; DRAHOS, supra note 1, at 76-77.
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will, as a property becomes essential for the person who is the subject of this will to live in the
social context. As a corollary, to deny a property right means also denial of free will.8
However, free will in the external world cannot be carried through in the external word in such
form  as  it  exists  in  the  mental  world.  This  is  because  in  the  external  world,  others  property
rights that are an embodiment of others free will exist. It is inevitable to restrict one’s property
right, as long as it is related to the others’ property right. This coordination becomes one task of
a social policy.9
It is generally believed that this consideration has a significant impact on intellectual property
rights. This consideration would support the view that the excise of the property right should
be confined to physical restrictions so that a person with a free will can live in a physical society
and that the right need not to restrict others freedom beyond that is necessary to provide this
property right. In other words, as intellectual property rights clashes with the exercise of others'
property rights which are the embodiment of others’ free will, it becomes difficult to justify the
intellectual property as an absolute right, because it is an expression of free will. It is thus
logically inevitable that Hegel justified copyright not just on the expression of free will, but also
based on the incentives of promoting science and arts.10
1.3 Traits of Intellectual Property Rights and Welfare
While it is true that the intellectual property right is a right on the intangibles, it is needless to
say that the subject matters of the intellectual property right, the “intellectual property” is
different from the tangible objects. Thus it is correct to call it a right on the information, in this
context. However, the meaning of “information” may be questioned. The information that is
the  subject  matter  of  intellectual  property  right  actually  is  a  pattern  of  human action.  As  the
intellectual property right restricts the patterns of human actions, it restricts the freedom of
8 HEGEL, supra note 6, at 182, 184-185; DRAHOS, supra note 1, at 77.
9 HEGEL, supra note 6, at 590-591.
10 In addition, Japanese patent law allows exercise of rights against the independent inventor and this makes
it difficult to view the right as a natural right. Even if there is an original prior inventor, the applicant who files for
patent  would  be  prioritized.  See  Japanese  Patent  Law  art.  39.1,  first  to  file  rule.  Unless  the  prior  inventor  has
prepared for production (Japanese Patent Law art. 79.1), the original inventor cannot even use his/her own
invention, as it would infringe the right of the patent holder. See Yoshiyuki Tamura, Tokkyoken no K?shi to
Dokusenkinshih? [Exercise of Patent Right and Anti-monopoly Law], in SHIJ?, JIY?, CHITEKIZAISAN [MARKET, FREEDOM
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY] 141, 143-144 (2003). Thus to explain patent right as a natural right, it has to be
where the exercise against the independent creator or inventor has to be denied, in the manner similar to a
copyright. See for example, ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 182 (1974). However there is a room
to justify this by using Lockean proviso and a positivistic verification of this possibility has to be explored. See
Gordon, supra note 1, at 624.
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human actions. When the thing-likeness of the object of this right is emphasized, the right may
be simply viewed to exist for a thing, rather than information, and the fact that the right cuts
out  a  pattern  of  human  action  may  be  disregarded.  Intellectual  property  right  is  merely  a
privilege that artificially restraints patterns of human actions that human being otherwise would
freely engage in, physically.11
As  seen  with  the  Lockean  and  Hegelian  theses,  if  the  intellectual  property  right  is  a  right  to
restraint others freedom, the proposition of creation alone cannot justify the right that broadly
restricts others` freedom. Thus, the justification for intellectual property right needs to be
refocused on the fact that the right protects not only the interests of the individual right holder,
but also the system of rights benefits the interests of the many. In other words, it is possible to
bring  the  perspectives  of  welfare  or  efficiency,  that  the  public  suffers  from  the  loss  from  the
decreased intellectual creation, unless free riding is prevented to a certain degree.12 13 In  this
case, the proposition of creation becomes a passive justification for restricting others’ freedom,
based on intellectual property right system that actively implements the objectives of welfare
and efficiency.14
11 See Gordon, supra note  1,  at  617,  619,  621-622.  Gordon  argues  that  the  label  of  property  is  used  in
intellectual property to describe the relationship between a person and a person, not confined to a person and a
thing,  as  is  the  case  of  the  ownership  right  in  the  tangibles.  Thus  she  stresses  that  intellectual  property  rights
should be called a right over a similar patterns of human action.  In addition to this, see DRAHOS, supra note 1, at
17-21, 32-33. Drahos starts from the philosophical question over the existence of the intangible thing and argues
that intellectual property right is not a property right but a privilege to restrict the act of uses of others.
12 SUSUMU MORIMURA, ZAISANKEN NO RIRON [THEORY OF PROPERTY RIGHT] 168-171 (1995).
13 For Constitutional law based position of this argument, see Yoshiyuki Tamura, Ky???chitsujo to
Minp?gaku [Competitive Order and Civil Law], in K?????? NO SHIK?KEISHIKI [PERSPECTIVES OF
COMPETITION LAW] 35, 50-52 (1999). Narifumi Kadomatsu, Keizaiteki Jiy?ken [Right to Economic Freedom],
in 2 KENP? [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] 213, 234-235 (Takayuki Andoh ed., 2001). A detailed explanation that uses
the protection of fundamental right, duty to support may be criticized from the Constitutional law scholarship
that is premised on the traditional indirect application theory of Constitutional law.
14 YOSHIYUKI TAMURA, CHITEKIZAISAN H? [INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW] 20 (4th ed., 2006).
Under the current Japanese patent law, the discovery of useful medicinal plant in an unknown regions
will still be denied of patent protection categorically, as long as it remains a mere discovery (Patent Law 2.1.1). This
is  regardless  of  the  assessment  whether  there  is  a  need to  provide  incentives  for  these  types  of  exploration.  This
may be explained using the natural rights theory in a passive manner. The origin of the Art. 2.1.1 of the Japanese
patent law that distinguishes the discovery of the law of nature and patentable invention is based on the
perspective of Josef Kohler who actually uses the natural rights theory. See JOSEF KOHLER,  LEHRBUCH DES
PATENTRECHTS 13-17 (1908). See also Yoshiyuki Tamura, Tokkyohatsumei no Teigi [Definition of Patent Invention], in
SHIJ?, JIY?, CHITEKIZAISAN [MARKET, FREEDOM AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY], supra note 10, at 125, 128-129.
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1.4 Difficulties in Assessing Efficiency and Legitimization by Democratic Process
At this juncture, it has to be stressed that the justification based on efficiency and the possibility
of improving welfare, in and of itself does not automatically leads to the optimal allocation of
resources. Information asymmetry in the market creates transaction costs, and actual market
operates in a competitive condition that is far from perfect competition and to bring the market
to  a  perfect  competition  is  highly  difficult.  Furthermore,  that  an  institution  would  optimally
allocate resources may be illusory. In this context, it is more pragmatic to justify a specific
intellectual property institutional arrangement would lead to an efficient result or a probable
improvement of welfare, regardless whether such arrangement is optimal or wealth-
maximizing.15
However, actively justifying the institution of intellectual property with efficiency perspectives
raises the following question – that the assessment of efficiency is nearly impossible. Gains or
loss in social efficacy in the adoption of a particular institutional arrangement of intellectual
property is difficult to measure. This is because not only the definition of efficiency is debated,
but also comparison of each individual utility is difficult. Moreover, as intellectual property
right involves the trade off between the short term static efficiency against the improvement of
long term dynamic efficiency, the assessment of its efficacy has the axis of time as well.16
These difficulties in the assessment of efficiency make it less convincing to use a consequential
method to justify a specific institutional arrangement of intellectual property by looking at the
degree of efficiency gains from its adoption. Thus the positive justification of intellectual
property needs to be based on not merely the degree of efficiency,  but from the fact  that the
legitimacy of the process of adopting each arrangement. For example, a typical example would be
the democratic decision making process used by the legislature and the justification for the
intellectual property right in this case is partially dependent on the political responsibilities of
the legislature.
1.5 Pitfalls of Legitimization by Democratic Decision and the Legitimacy of Process
Democratic decision making alone does not legitimize every decisions. This is not just because
the nature of intellectual property right which necessarily restricts other’s freedom forces the
15 Among the scholars, the incentive theory sometime understood as a theoretical ground to maximise
wealth. See Naoki Koizumi, Chosakuken Seido no Kihonriron [Normative Theory of Copyright Institution], in AMERICA
CHOSAKUKEN SEIDO [US COPYRIGHT SYSTEM]  13, 25 (1996). It  should be noted that even though the incentive
theory is used in such manners by some, this is not always the logical conclusions from all of the incentive theories.
16 See for details, Nari Lee, Toward a Pluralistic Theory on an Efficacious Patent Institution, 6 J.
Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 224 (2007), also available as Berkeley Center for Law and Technology, Law and
Technology Scholarship, Paper 35, at http://repositories.cdlib.org/bclt/lts/35.
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trade offs between the freedom and efficiency. Even from the point of efficiency alone,
democratic decision making process has an inherent limitation. This due to the limitation of
political process in the sense that the process is more easily influenced by the aggregated
minority interests that may easily be organised than the interests that are disaggregated thus
difficult to organise. Despite this limitation of the political process, for example in the case of
the ownership right of a tangible has a focal point where a use is connected to a specific
tangible object, and the right is catered around this focal point. This does not mean that the
ownership right over the tangibles does not regulate the person to person relationship, and that
it simply regulates the person to an object relationship. Even when it regulates a person to
person relationship, the focal point stops an ownership rights to expand indefinitely.
However, in the case of intellectual property where the patterns of human actions are regulated
without any physical contact with a specific tangible object, a physical restriction against the
expansion of a right does not exist. This is because there is no such focal point. Moreover, as
this may regulate human action nearly without any geographical limit, the right may also be
expanded beyond territorial borders.17 With  growth  of  economies,  the  value  of  the  privileges
reaches beyond the borders. In response to this, a rational choice of a company (especially
MNEs) would be to strongly protect their own intellectual property rights both domestically and
internationally. As a result, intellectual property right may become stronger than it is demanded
by the societal conditions. In deed, intellectual property rights show the tendency to be
internationally expanded and to be strengthened, as exemplified by international treaties such
as TRIPS agreements, as well as bilateral agreements, as used unilaterally by the United States.18
Even within a national border, the legislative process is biased due to the fact that the process
reflects the interests of the easily organizable few large companies, than the interests of the
SMEs and individuals that are difficult to organize. The democratic decision made in this
manner  may  be  biased  in  terms  of  welfare  aspect.19 In  addition,  as  argued  in  the  above,  the
legitimization by the process cannot be sought from the legislative process alone, as freedom
17 See DRAHOS, supra note 1. For a detailed discussion on the first connection thesis of Drahos, see also
Nari Lee, Patent Eligible Subject Matter Reconfiguration and the Emergence of Proprietarian Norms - The
Patent Eligibility of Business Methods, 45 IDEA 321, at 351-354 (2005).
18 For  the  discussions  on the  role  of  MNEs on the  international  trend of  of  strengthening  of  intellectual
property right through TRIPS agreement and bilateral treaties, see PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? (2004); Peter Drahos, Intellectual Property
Industries and the Globalization of Intellectual Property: Pro-Monopoly and Anti-Development?, 3 Intell. Prop. L. & Pol’y J.
65 (2004); Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement,  82  Ind.  L.  J. 827 (2007). See also Peter K Yu, Five
Disharmonizing Trends in the International Intellectual Property Regime, in 4  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
INFORMATION WEALTH 73, 96-97 (Peter K. Yu, ed., 2007).
19  Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L. Rev., 1575, 1637-1638 (2003); DRAHOS,
supra note 1, at 135-140. See also Jessica Litman, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 35-69, 144-145, 192-194 (2000) (on the US
copyright law and institution).
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need to be ensured as well as the welfare. It follows from these perspectives that the theories on
intellectual  property  institution  need  to  consider  four  key  elements  and  the  division  of  their
functions and roles - market (or market oriented decision making) surrounding the uses of
intellectual property, the legislative, the administrative and the judiciary.20 21
2. Division of Competence and Functions among Market, Legislative,
Administrative, Judiciary as a Decision Making Process
2.1 Utilization of Market
A market based decision provides stimulus for improved goods and services through the process
of competition. In addition to this, as market operates via price mechanism that is based on
supply-demand information of the goods and services, trading of goods and services in the
market would lead to a more efficient allocation of resources, although it may not be optimal.22
Market excels in inducing a certain type of innovation, and discovering and distributing of
private and individual information. This function cannot easily be replaced by authoritative
decision making23 by the legislative, administrative and the judiciary.24 Moreover, the idea of
liberty that essentially accompanies the market principle makes market oriented decision
making more acceptable over the authoritative decision making.25 When the market oriented
decision making is functioning, the decision making is not done by a specific individual and
thus an individual person is not controlled by another individual. In this sense, market
oriented decision making may promote more freedom and liberty than an authoritative
20 Yoshiyuki Tamura, Tokkyoseido wo meguru H? to Seisaku [Law and Policy over Patent System] 1339 Jurist 124
(2007).
21 DRAHOS, supra note 1, at 173-193, 199-223. See also Li, supra note 1, at 59-64.
22 F.  A.  Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 Am. Econ. Rev. 519 (1945); KEIKO ISHIHARA,
K????SEISAKU NO GENRI TO GENJITSU [COMPETITION POLICY - PRINCIPLES AND REALITY] 22-24 (1997); PAUL
MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 27-28 (1992).
23 For the distinction between market based and authoritative decision, see YOSHIO HIRAI,
H?SEISAKUGAKU [THEORY ON LAW AND POLICY] 62-68 (2d ed., 1995).
24 Id. at 121-125, 130; Hayek, supra note 22; ISHIHARA, supra note 22, at 6-7.
25 HIRAI, supra note  23,  at  123;  ISHIHARA, supra note 22, at 3-5; Hitohiko Hirano, 1994-nendo Nihon
??tetsugakkai Gakujutsutaikai T?itsu Theme ni tsuite [On the Theme of Japan Legal Philosophy Conference of
1994], 1994 H?tetsugaku Nenp? [Annals Legal Phil.] 1, 4 (1995).
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decision making.26 As a corollary, when questions concerning efficiency are raised, it may be
sufficient to relegate it to market, as long as the market is functioning.
2.2 When Should Law Intervene? (Authoritative Decision)
2.2.1 Eligibility of Technological Determination
Law needs to intervene when the market does not function. However, it is important to note
that it is nearly impossible to build an institution that is optimal from the point of efficiency
through authoritative decision making. As a definitional problem, for example, when the
comparison of individual utility is difficult, a gauge to assess efficiency cannot be assured. Even
if the gauge can be obtained, assessing efficiency gains or loss from a specific decision is not far
from easy.27 As market has the advantages that are described in the above, this is the very reason
why a functioning market needs to be utilized. Even when an authoritative intervention is
considered, it is necessary to approach it functionally and ask if there is really a market failure,
if the authoritative intervention could improve the situation, and which institution then would
be most competent in making that decision. In this manner, it is possible to adopt efficiency
based perspective to the construction of the institution.
Some administrative organization may be more competent than the legislature and the judiciary
on observing market trends and may be better equipped to issue a speedy response that meets
the market condition. For example, in intellectual property, patent and trade office is a typical
example of such organisation.
2.2.2 Question of Political Responsibility
The difficulty in measuring efficiency makes it also difficult to legitimize the norm (rule) that is
established through authoritative decision making, simply by the efficiency of the outcome
alone.  As  a  result,  the  legitimization  of  rule  (norm)  needs  to  be  sought  not  just  from  the
achievement of efficiency, but also from the process that has been employed to get there. In
cases where there is uncertainty over the efficiency, the legitimization of the process becomes
more desirable. In addition, these types of political responsibility need to be borne by the
legislative, and not by the judiciary.
26 When a good such as intellectual property where an authority need to interfere to produce it via the
market, the freedom and liberty enjoyed as a result of this interference cannot be based on the market based
decision. Rather, this is a restriction based on the authoritative decision making.
27 See for an example of patent system and law, Lee, supra note 16.
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2.2.3 Distortion in the Authoritative Decision Making Process
However, complexity still persists. SMEs and consumers interests are likely to the IP users’
interests. As argued in the above, despite their aggregate sum of interests may be large, the
interests that are difficult to be coordinated and organized may not be prioritized than the right
holders interests, often represented and easily organized by a large companies, even when their
aggregate interests is smaller. In this context, the judiciary may have a better competence to
ensure their interests than other authorities.28
3. Conceptualising a Theory of Intellectual Property Law and Policy
3.1 Introduction
A process oriented perspective of intellectual property right provides important insights on the
institution of law. I have earlier proposed the following three steps to be part of the
interpretative and legislative theory in the construction of intellectual property institution.29
First is the perspective of market oriented intellectual property law. By focusing on the sharing
of function between the market and law, the junction where the market stops and law need to
intervene must be sought.
Secondly, when the law based decision is necessary, the next step should be to determine which
organization would be best suit to exercise competence and actually make the decision.
(institutional perspective) For example, a decision need to be done on whether the court based
decision is sufficient, or whether an administrative organization such as the patent offices needs
to intervene.
At this point, the selection on the concrete forms and substance of regulation need to be
evaluated. For example, would a remuneration right (including compensatory damages) be
sufficient or an injunctive relief is required; should the protection be such that a system of
registration is adopted so that assignment of rights can be facilitated. In earlier work I called
this a functional perspective on intellectual property law.
28 Yoshiyuki Tamura, Gijyutsukanky? no Henka ni Tai?shita Chosakuken no Seigen no Kanousei ni tsuite
[On the Possibility to Limit the Scope of Copyright in response to the Technological Changes], 1255 Jurist 124
(2003).
29 Yoshiyuki Tamura, Chitekizaisan H? S?ron [Introduction to Intellectual Property Law], in SHIJ?, JIY?,
CHITEKIZAISAN [MARKET, FREEDOM AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY], supra note 10, at 73; TAMURA, supra note
14, at 7-21.
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Thirdly, the impact of the proposed rule as an outcome the above exercise on the individual
freedom of thought and action need to be scrutinised. From this perspective of intellectual
property law as system of law governing individual freedom, it needs to be examined whether
the proposed rule would excessively control and restrict the individual freedom.
This paper argues that a process oriented perspective needs to be added to these three steps in
the construction of intellectual property law institution. The view to think about intellectual
property  law  from  three  different  aspects  of  market  oriented,  functional,  and  freedom
governing institution of law aims to actualise an efficacious institution through division of the
competences (market, legislative, administrative, and judiciary) and to ascertain individual
freedom. It includes the process oriented perspective30. These two view points i.e. process and
division of competence may be said to form the fabric of the theory of intellectual property to
propose a system of intellectual property.
In the following, I would like to clarify how the process oriented perspective that is proposed in
the above is applied to actual makings of intellectual property law.
3.2 Division of Functions in Market and Law
The institution of intellectual property functions through the market that creates by enabling
the trading on entitlements. The entitlements that these transactions are based stem from the
artificial restriction certain patterns of human actions which otherwise physically could be done
freely. In this sense, intellectual property law utilises the market based decision making. At the
same time, because of these market-based exchanges would not occur without the legal grants of
rights, it should be viewed as a legal intervention, as it does not completely delegate the
decision making to the market.
3.2.1 Determining the Necessity of Protection
The protection of an intellectual property right is not necessary if the market functions without
the intervention of the intellectual property system. This position is justified from the incentive
theory,  and not  from the  natural  rights  theory  as  it  has  been  argued  in  the  above.31 When a
specific subject matter is not regulated explicitly in the intellectual property law, one may argue
that there is a need to provide legal protection, and that further this legal deficiency calls for a
30 On the foundation of the intellectual property, see YOSHIYUKI TAMURA,  CHOSAKUKEN H? GAISETSU
[COPYRIGHT LAW] 7-8 (2d ed., 2001).
31 TAMURA, supra note  14,  at  8-14.  See  also  NOBUHIRO NAKAYAMA,  MULTIMEDIA TO CHOSAKUKEN
[MULTIMEDIA AND COPYRIGHT LAW] 4-5 (1996).
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legislation (legislative reform). These types of arguments cannot be grounded on the incentive
theories, but on the natural rights theory. For example, when relevant incentives are present,
such as market lead time and the reputations, appropriate level of innovative production may
be developed without the legal intervention of intellectual property. In this case, an artificially
constructed right loses the ground to restrict physically “free” human actions. This in turn,
means  that  a  creation  of  intellectual  right  over  this  particular  subject  matter  becomes
groundless as well.
3.2.2 Distinguishing Market Oriented Approach from Market Driven Approach
Even when a market oriented intellectual property law is adopted, it is important to distinguish
this from other market based approaches such as a market driven approach. A market driven
approach views market as a universal solution, in the sense that law creates market based on the
exclusive rights on intellectual property, and that market takes care of the rest.32 The market
driven approach is based on the optimistic view on the occurrence of efficient transaction,
which underestimates the costs from the exclusive rights.33 Needless to say, the Coasean world
where the rational parties have perfect information, and where there is no transaction costs
(and further no wealth effect), thus making the Coase theorem real, actually does not exist.34
32 See Frank H. Easterbrook?Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. Chi. Legal. F. 207 (1996),
applying Coase Theorem to intellectual property law. Compare, Hideaki Serizawa, ProCD v. Zeidenberg no
Bunseki [Analysis on ProCD v. Zeidenberg], 61 Hougaku 189, 231-243 (1997). A concrete application of these
types of thinking is the prospect theory that argues the that patent law coordinate the uses surrounding the
invention, by preventing the duplicative investment and rent seeking, by early grant of right. See Edmund W.
Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J. Law & Econ. 265 (1977). See also I. Trotter Hardy,
The Proper Regime for Cyberspace, 55 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 993 (1994) (utilising this argument to put forward a strict
liability rule for copyright infringement by a third party). See also the opinion of Judge Easterbrook in ProCD,
Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913,
930-932 (2d Cir. 1994). Against these applications, see Yoshiyuki Tamura, Ch?sh?ka suru Biotechnology to
Tokkyoseido no Arikata (2) [Patent protection of Biotechnology in the Information Age (pt. 2)], 11 Intell. Prop.
L. & Pol’y J. 65, 68, 73-78 (2006). See also Tamura, supra note 4; Maiko Murai, Chosakuken Shij? no Seisei to
Fair Use (1)(2) [Copyright Market and Fair Use (pts. 1 & 2)], 6 Intell. Prop. L. & Pol’y J. 155 (2005), 7 Intell.
Prop. L. & Pol’y J. 139 (2005).
33 Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 839,
877 (1990); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 989, 1048-51
(1997); Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante versus Ex Post Justification for Intellectual Property,  71  U.  Chi.  L.  Rev.  129,  148
(2004); Burk & Lemley, supra note 19, at 1648-1649.
34 RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW 114 (1988): See also Lemley, Economics, supra
note 33, at 1048.
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It is likely that the cost from the exclusive rights becomes greater, the earlier the rights are
allocated.35 In addition, the information (if it is not encoded) can be accessed and used by any
body and as such, it has characteristics of public goods. When an exclusive right is granted on
its use, it may create costs over the uses that would have remained unrestricted, without
intellectual property.
3.2.3 Means to Identify the Original Right Holder
When incentive theory is used as a foundation for intellectual property rights, it may deny the
axiom that the creator is always entitled to a right.36 Of course, to incentivize creative activities,
it may be necessary to return the benefits [of creations] to the creators themselves. However, if
the rights are, for example, given to the persons who the creators trade with, then the benefit
may be shared with the creators through this transaction. Further still, if there is a need to give
incentive to those other than the creators, then an arrangement to allow the benefits to flow to
these others may be sufficient. For example, it may recommendable to grant the rights to the
organisations that distribute the benefits.37 Moreover, to stimulate the use of the intellectual
property, external users, it may be preferable to provide environment where the permission for
use of intellectual property is easily obtainable by the external users. If these above
considerations are prioritized, this would lead to a view that in the case of the creation which
typically requires many producers, a uniform control by an organization and not the individual
creator may be preferred. The number of the users needs to be considered in the determination
to what degree should the utilisation of the intellectual property need to be prioritized. In this
35 See for the similar argument against the scope of protection of the exclusive right, Merges & Nelson, supra
note 33, at 877. An extremely large cost leads to the tragedy of the commons. See M. A. Heller & R. S. Eisenberg,
Can patents deter innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698 (1998). See also Nari Lee,
Patented Standards and the Tragedy of Anti-Commons, 7 TEOLLISOIKEUDELLISIA KIRJOITUKSIA 1 (Ari Saarnilehto ed.,
2006), also available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=881702; Kenji Yamamoto, Gendai Fuh?k?i  H?gaku ni okeru
‘Kousei’ tai ‘Kenri’ [Welfare and Right in Contemporary Tort Law], 133 Minsh?h? Zasshi 875, 903-904, 912-921 (2006).
36 Under the current law, there are several variation. As the case of copyright on works made for hire
(Japanese Copyright Law art. 15.1), there is no established principle that the right belongs to the creator. See
Tamura, supra note 29, at 388-390. Moreover, the case of employee invention, the Japanese patent law provides for
a system where the employer could claim the right as their own. See for the policy discussion on this, Yoshiyuki
Tamura & Noriyuki Yanagawa, Shokumu Hatsumei no Taika ni kansuru Kisorironteki na Kenkyu [On the Theoretical
Foundation for Evaluating the Remuneration for an Employee Invention], 128 Minsh?h? Zasshi 447, 448-451 (2003).
Also Yoshiyuki Tamura, Shokumu Hatsumei no Arikata [On Employee Invention], in SHOKUMU HATSUMEI [EMPLOYEE
INVENTIONS] 2, 9-13 (Yoshiyuki Tamura & Keizo Yamamoto eds., 2005). See also Yoshiyuki Tamura, S?sakusha no
Hogo to Chitekizaisan no Katsuy? no S?koku [Reconciling Protection of Creator with Utilization by Third Party in Intellectual
Property Law], 29 Nihon K?gy?shoyukenh? Gakkai Nenp? [Ann. Indus. Prop. L.] 95, 97-98 (2006).
37 See Yoshiyuki Tamura, Aoiro Hakk? Diode Jiken K?soshin Wakaikankoku ni tsuite [Blue LED Case
and Reasonable Remuneration for Employee’s Invention], 8 Intell. Prop. L. & Pol’y J. 1, 5-6 (2005).
Nordic Journal of Commercial Law
issue 2009#1
14
manner, the allocation of the intellectual property right needs to be based on diverse policy
considerations.38 39
3.3 Division of Competences among the Legal Decision Making Bodies
Protection of intellectual property right is called for, when the legal intervention is called for in
terms  of  the  division  of  functions  of  the  market  and  the  law.  When  an  intellectual  property
right is selected over the market, the next questions would include which authority (among
legislative, administrative, and the judiciary) would make the decisions on the types of rights,
the scope of rights, and the available remedies through which a right of exclusion could be
enforced, for example whether a remunerative right is sufficient or a separate regulation is
required.
3.3.1 Division of Competence based on Organizational/Technical Proficiency
The choice of the decision making body among the legislative, the administrative and the
judiciary, should be based on the consideration on the each organisation’s competence for
expert decision making and stability of decision. This perspective of technical proficiency may
be applied widely through various legislative and interpretative theories of intellectual property,
in the ranges of the regulation of verbatim industrial copying,40 definition of patent eligible
invention,41 doctrine of equivalents,42 defence of invalidity in patent infringement,43 file
38 For details, see Tamura, Reconciliation, supra note  36.  See  for  the  warning  against  the  romantic
authorship that does not take a strictly incentive based theory, JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND
SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 42, 56-59, 121-143, 155, 168-173, 177-
179, 183-184 (1996).
39 Furthermore, an interpretation that aims to allow fragmented allocation of the right may not be wise.
For example, if a new type of right that is acknowledge by law after the assignment of the original copyright, it is
possible to reserve the new right on the original right holder (assignor). When one considers the impact on the
third party of the transaction, after the right has been originally allocated, this fragmented allocation of rights
may not be desirable policy direction. For an opposing view to this position, see Tadashi Fujino,
Chosakurinsetsuken J?tokeiyaku no Teiketsugo ni H?teisareta Shibunken no Kizoku [Who owns the right of
Public Transmission newly legislated after the assignment of neighbouring rights?], 19 Intell. Prop. L. & Pol’y
J. 313 (2008).
40 Yoshiyuki Tamura, FUSEI K???? H? [UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW] 282-287 (2d ed., 2003).
41 Tamura, supra note  14.  On  biotechnology,  see  also  Yoshiyuki  Tamura, Ch?sh?ka suru Biotechnology to
Tokkyoseido no Arikata (1-3) [Patent protection of Biotechnology in the Information Age (pts. 1-3)],  10 Intell.  Prop. L. &
Pol’y J. 49, 11 Intell. Prop. L. & Pol’y J. 65, 12 Intell. Prop. L. & Pol’y J. 91 (2006). On business method patents,
see Lee, supra note 17.
42 Tamura, supra note 29, at 104-106.
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wrapper estoppel,44 scope of enquiry for cancellation of trial decision,45 binding power,46 scope
of the double jeopardy principle,47 protection of applied arts,48 interface of exercise of
intellectual property right and anti-monopoly law49 and the like.
3.3.2 Window on Legitimacy and Correction of the Bias - A New Proposal for the Decision of the
Legislative and the Judiciary
Two more distinctive perspectives need to be added to this perspective of technical proficiency.
On one hand, as intellectual property institution temporarily restricts freedom, its active
justification need to be founded on the efficiency gains from the adopting of the intellectual
property. However as argued in the above, it is difficult to verify the efficiency gain and thus
instead, it becomes necessary to justify the institution by legitimization of the democratic
process through which the institution is adopted. However as noted in the above, the process of
the policy making is structured in such manner that it reflects easily the interests that may be
easily  organised (ex.  large companies)  and that the interests  of  the individuals  or SMEs whose
interests are relatively difficult to organise. This structural bias needs to be corrected.
43 Yoshiyuki Tamura, Tokkyoshingai Sosh? ni okeru K?chigijutsu no K?ben to T?zenmuk? no K?ben
[Defence of Prior Art and Invalidity in Patent Infringement Litigation], in KIN?TEKI CHITEKIZAISAN H? NO
RIRON [FUNCTIONAL THEORY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY] 58 (1996). For a detailed discussion, see Makiko
Takabe, Tokkyoh? 104-j?-no-3 wo Kangaeru [Consideration on Patent Law Article 104-3], 11 Intell. Prop. L. &
Pol’y J. 123 (2006).
44 Yoshiyuki Tamura, Handankikan Bunka no Ch?seigenri to shiteno H?taikinhangen no H?ri
[Reconsidering Filewrapper Estoppel], 1 Intell. Prop. L. & Pol’y J. 11 (2004). See also Hiroshi Yoshida, Saikin
no Saibanrei ni miru Kinhangen no Kenky?: Shinpan [A Study of Estoppel in recent case: New Edition], 1 Intell.
Prop. L. & Pol’y J. 41 (2004); Yasuyuki Echi, Shinsakeika Kinhangen no Rirontekikonkyo to Handan Wakugumi
(1)-(5) [The Doctorine of “Prosecution History Estoppel” (pts. 1-5)], 155-6 H?gakurons? 1 (2004), 156-1
??gakurons? 37 (2004), 156-2 H?gakurons? 112 (2004), 157-1 H?gakurons? 20 (2005), 157 H?gakurons? 28
(2005).
45 Yoshiyuki Tamura, Tokkyomuk?shinpan to Shinketsutorikeshisosh? no Kankei ni tsuite [Relashionship
between Trial for Invalidation of a Patent and Suit against Trial Decision], in KIN?TEKI CHITEKIZAISAN H? NO
RIRON [FUNCTIONAL THEORY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY], supra note 43, at 138, 138-162.
46 KAZUO MASUI & YOSHIYUKI TAMURA, TOKKYO HANREI GUIDE [PATENT CASE LAW GUIDE] 281-287 (3rd
ed., 2005). See also Hiroaki Murakami, Torikeshi Sosh? ni okeru Shinri no Han’i to Hanketsu no K?sokuryoku [Scope of
Examination and Binding Force of Judgment in Administrative Litigation], 10 Intell. Prop. L. & Pol’y J. 145 (2006).
47 MASUI & TAMURA, supra note 46, at 289-294; Ayumu Iijima, Tokkyomuk?shinpan ni okeru Ichijifusairi
[Double Jeopardy in Patent Invalidation Proceedings], 16 Intell. Prop. L. & Pol’y J. 247 (2007).
48 Tamura, supra note 29, at 31-36. See also Liu Hsiao-Chien, Jitsuy?hin ni Fusareru Design no
Bijutuchosakubutu Gait?sei (1)(2) [Copyrightability of Functional Designs (pts. 1-2)], 6 Intell. Prop. L. & Pol’y
J. 189 (2005), 7 Intell. Prop. L. & Pol’y J. 177 (2005).
49 Tamura, supra note 10. See also TADASHI SHIRAISHI,  GIJUTSU TO KY?S? NO HOUTEKIK?Z? [LEGAL
STRUCTURE OF TECHNOLOGY AND COMPETITION] (1994); Tadashi Shiraishi, Chitekizaisanken no License Kyozetsu to
Dokkinh? [Refusal to License an Intellectual Property and Antimonopoly Law], in 21-SEIKI NI OKERU CHITEKIZAISAN NO
TENB? [PROSPECT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE 21ST CENTURY] 229 (Institute of Intellectual Property ed.,
2000); Toshifumi Hienuki, Chitekizaisanken to Dokusenkinshih? [Intellectual Property Rights and Antimonopoly Law], in
SHIJ?, CHITEKIZAISAN, KY?S?H? [MARKET, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, COMPETITION LAW] 1 (2007)
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These two perspectives can be applied to the division of the competence of the legislative and
the judiciary, in the context of intellectual property law.
First, when the judiciary faces an interpretation of law to create an intellectual property right or
to strengthen it, the judiciary need to respect the political responsibility borne by the legislative
branch concerning the efficiency determination. This means that the judiciary need to adopt a
means of interpretation according to the objective of the law, derived from the structure of the
law. One reason behind this is because the court is a suitable institution to deal with political
responsibility. In addition to this, a comprehensive decision or a decision that requires a
specific expertise, the court may have a limited competence. This is the problem of technical
proficiency.  Moreover,  if  the  right  holders’  interests  are  easily  reflected  in  the  policy  making
process, due to the structural bias, a correction of this bias via the route of legislation is
required. Thus the determination on this aspect may have to take a cautiously path.
An example of this in Japan is the question surrounding the copyright infringement liability,
especially on the third party liability. Recently the courts in Japan has applied a direct
infringement liability to those who provide means and services to induce large scale private
copying or non-commercial use of copyrighted material, through a type of vicarious liability
doctrine known as the “Karaoke doctrine”.50 As  a  result,  the  courts  allowed  claims  for
injunction against these third parties.51 Originally,  the  doctrine  was  applied  to  an  area  where
there is a personal control over the act of physical uses and users. However when this doctrine
is applied to the provision of means [of physical uses], an ironical conclusion may occur. This is
because when the actual uses that are tied to the finding of the infringement liability might be
allowed non infringing uses that are under the exceptional provisions in the copyright law.
When  the  court  is  allowed  to  interpret  the  law  in  this  manner,  this  amounts  to  the  judicial
creation of infringement. This would require a separate debate on the questions such as -
whether to regulate such type of conduct at all (ex. a conduct of providing a system that induces
50 Karaoke  doctrine  is  based  on the  Japanese  Supreme Court  Decision of  15  Mar.  1988,  42  Minsh? 199
<Club Catseye>. See Tamura, supra note  30,  at  149-153.  This  case  dealt  with  the  liability  of  the  Karaoke  bar
proprietor over the singing conduct of customers. The decision is understood to have established two requirements
for Karaoke bar proprietor’s third party liability, that is, (i) the bar proprietor manages (management) the conduct
of the customers and (ii) derives the benefits from this (benefit). These two conditions are generally understood to
form the basis of the third party liability for copyright infringement in Japan. See for the applicability and critique
on the decision, Tatsuhiro Ueno, Iwayuru ‘Karaoke H?ri’ no Saikent? [Reexamining So-called Karaoke Doctrine], in
CHITEKIZAISANH? TO KY?S?H? NO GENDAITEKITENKAI [RECENT DEVELOPMENT OF THE ACADEMIC DISPUTES ON
THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS AND THE COMPETITION LAW] 781 (2006).
51 See  Tokyo  D.  Ct.  Decision  of  9  Apr.  2002,  1780  HANREI JIH? 25 <File Rogue Neighbouring Right
Provisional Order>; Tokyo D. Ct Decision of 29 Jan. 2003, 1810 HANREI JIH? 29 <same, interim decision>; Tokyo
D. Ct Decision of 11 Apr. 2002, 1780 HANREI JIH? 25 <File Rogue Copyright Provisional Order>; Tokyo D. Ct
Decision of 29 Jan. 2003, Heisei 14 (wa) 4249 <same, interim decision>. See for the detailed case commentary,
Yoshiyuki Tamura, Kensaku Site wo meguru Chosakukenh?j? no  Shomondai  (3)  [Copyright  Issues  on  Search  Engines  (pt.
3)], 18 Intell. Prop. L. & Pol’y J. 31 (2007).
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a non commercial uses and private copying in large scale); if regulated, should it entitle a right
holder a pecuniary remuneration right similar to the rights provided by the private audio-visual
recording levy system, or should it include also injunctive relief. These questions are best
considered to be within the mandate of the legislature.52
Needless to say, this does not mean that the judiciary should not interpret the law in such ways
to create or strengthen an intellectual property right. However, what this paper argues is that
such interpretation should also consider the structure of the law and objectives of the
institution that can be deduced from it. For example, a claim based patent system creates a
principle that the alleged infringing technology in the patent infringement litigation will fall
outside  the  scope  of  the  patent  protection,  if  the  claim does  not  literally  read  on the  alleged
infringing technology. (Japanese Patent Law art. 70.1) However, if claiming system aims to
ensure the predictability among the interested parties, the court may affirm the infringement
even when the claim does not read on the allegedly infringing devise, if a specific element in a
patent claim can be easily substituted. (Doctrine of Equivalents).53 This  interpretation  is  one
implementation of legislative objective and naturally, is within the purview of the judicial
mandates.
In  addition,  under  the  current  laws,  there  should  be  cases  where  an  affirmative  intervention
from judiciary may be allowed. This would be case when it is obvious that where it is against the
efficiency and there is no obvious risk to inadvertently provide overlapping regulation, as there
may be no problem of conflicting technical proficiency.
An example of this is the application of the general tort principle under the Japanese Civil
Code Art 709 to a type of conduct that is not explicitly regulated in the intellectual property
law. As long as this is an interpretation that creates an intellectual property right, it has to be
cautiously considered, in principle. However, an exception does exist. This is because the
decision that the law should regulate a type of free riding conducts could have been made
52 For this reason, a joint tort liability may be utilised for those who provide a physical means, tied to the
infringement  of  the  physical  users.  See  Sup.  Ct  Decision  of  2  Mar.  2001,  55  MINSH? 185  <Night  Pub  G7
Appellate Decision>. See also for case commentary, Yoshiyuki Tamura, Karaoke  S?chi  Lease  Gy?sha no
Ky?d?fuh?k?isekinin no Seihi [The Liability of Karaoke Device Lease Business Proprietor], 694 NBL 14 (2000). In this
case, I argued elsewhere that the scope of the injunctive relief to be equivalent to that of the scope of indirection
infringement in patent law. See Tamura, supra note 51; Yoshiyuki Tamura, Takin?gata Kansetsushingai Seido ni yoru
Honshitsutekibubun no Hogo no Tekihi [Is it Proper to Protect Essential Part of the Invention under the Doctrine of
Contributory Infringement?],  15  Intell.  Prop.  L.  &  Pol’y  J.  167  (2007).  See  also  Katsumi  Yoshida, Chosakuken no
‘Kansetsushingai’ to Sashitomeseikyu [‘Indirect Infringement’ of Copyright and Injunction], in SHINSEDAI
CHITEKIZAISANH?SEISAKUGAKU NO S?SEI [ESTABLISHING LAW AND POLICY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY] 253
(Yoshiyuki Tamura ed., 2008).
53 Together with other requirements, see Sup. Ct. Decision of 24 Feb. 1988, 52 MINSH? 113 <Ball-splined
Shaft Bearing Decision>. See TAMURA, supra note 14, at 224-237.
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through a democratic decision making process, as long as the regulation is not an excessive
intervention. This may be the case of intellectual property laws, where there is an obvious
efficiency based value judgement behind the entire system of laws.54 For  example,  before  the
enactment of art. 2.1.3 of the Law on Prevention of Unfair Competition in Japan, the courts
used tort to regulate a verbatim commercial copying (of external design, features and shapes of
commercial products). (Tokyo H. Ct. Decision of 17 Dec. 1991, 23 CHISAISH? 808
<Mokumekesh?shi>)55 Similarly, the court used tort principle to protect a comprehensive data
base which fell outside the scope of copyright protection for lack of originality (creativity).
(Tokyo D. Ct. Decision of 25 May 2001, 1774 HANREI JIH? 132 <Super Front Man>) Mainly
these are the cases where there is obvious need to decide without having to wait for the
legislation. When it is believed that a separate legislation is required to provide the conditions
for protection, the court need to avoid sole judicial creation of intellectual property right. Some
of the recent Japanese court cases show a tendency to apply the general  tort  based liability  on
the free riding conducts, while holding that the act is outside the copyright protection, without
considering specific factors why copyright law shall not cover these conducts. (For example, IP
H.  Ct.  Decision  on Ts?kin Daigaku Law Course case.56) These decisions are questionable in
light of the perspectives of the above. This is because if there is a problem in the law, it needs to
be corrected through legislative process and the interests of those who would benefit from the
creation  of  intellectual  property  right  would  be  reflected  in  this  process.  In  principle,  the
decision whether such protection of their interests is necessary or not should be mandated to
the democratic decision making process.57
Secondly, a limiting interpretation of an intellectual property right need to be considered as a
judicial breathing room to reflect the users’ interests, and sometimes, irrespective of the
54 Yoshiyuki Tamura, Chitekizaisanken to Fuh?k?i [Intellectual Property Rights and Torts], in SHINSEDAI
CHITEKIZAISANH?SEISAKUGAKU NO S?SEI [ESTABLISHING LAW AND POLICY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY], supra
note 52, at 3. See also Atsumi Kubota, Fuh?k?ih?gaku kara mita Publicity [A note on the role of tort law in the protection
of the rights during the publicity building process: a tort law perspective], 133 Minsh?h? Zasshi 721, 741 (2006);
NOBUHIRO NAKAYAMA,  CHOSAKUKENHO [COPYRIGHT LAW] 209 (2007). In this case, to acknowledge the tort
liability, it is believed that the interests in suit is socially acknowledged as an interest that merits legal protection.
See Kubota, supra, at 741-743. However, this paper argues that at least in Japan, there is a general value judgment
embodied in the intellectual property that allows law to regulate the free riding to the extent that there are
insufficient incentives for research and development. This is a competitive prosperity theory, pointed out by
Hasegawa, supra note 21, at 18-24. The reason why the judiciary has to take a reserved approach is not because
there is no social acknowledge for the need but because the technological decision making is so complex that it
makes it difficult to take the political responsibility. Thus the premise that Kubota requires may not be necessary.
55 Yoshiyuki Tamura, Tanin no Sh?hin no Deddo Copy to Fuh???i no Seihi [Verbatim and Slavish
Imitation and Tort], 14 Tokkyokenky? [Patent Studies] 32 (1992).
56 Takakuni Yamane, Case Note, IP H. Ct. Decision of 15 Mar. 2006, Heisei 17 (ne) 10095 et. al., 18
Intell. Prop. L. & Pol’y J. 221 (2007).
57 Tamura, supra note 54.
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legislative objectives. This is because of the bias in the policy making process. When one
considers the structural difficulties to reflect the interests of the intellectual property users in
the legislation, the correction of this bias should not be relied on the legislation, and in this
context, the court need to ensure the freedom of the users. This is particularly so in the case
where  the  interpretation  is  not  based  on the  efficiency  gains,  but  on  the  ground of  freedom.
This requires neither technical proficiency nor political responsibility and thus calls for an
active intervention of the judiciary.
For example, a general exception of fair use does not exist in the Japanese copyright law.58 In
this context, the Japanese courts have freely adopted various means to limit copyrights. 59Even
in cases where such existing doctrine or limiting provisions cannot be applied, it is believed that
the courts should be allowed to generally limit a copyright to ensure the freedom of the users.60
61
3.3.3 Adjusting a Traditional Model of Rechtstaat /Rule of Law Principle - Adoption of a New
Perspective on the Division of Competence by the Administrative and the Judiciary
In the context of the Japanese patent law, the majority of commentator view that the there is no
discretion in the patent office as the patent grant is based on an “entitlement” perspective (i.e.
58 Yoshiyuki Tamura, Kensaku-site wo meguru Chosakukenh?j? no Shomondai (1) [Copyright Issues on Search
Engines (pt. 1)], 16 Intell. Prop. L. & Pol’y J. 73, 96-99 (2007).
59 There are several examples. See for example, Tokyo H. Ct. decision of 18 Feb. 2001, 1701 HANREI JIH?
157 <Setsu-Getsu-Ka>. The court ruled that the copyright of the calligraphy artwork included in the advertising
catalogue for lighting equipment is not infringed as the size of the reproduced calligraphy in the catalogue, 3-9 mm
per letter, was such that the creative expression in the calligraphy is not reproduced. In another decision, Tokyo D.
Ct. decision of 25 Jul. 2000, 1758 HANREI JIH? 137 <Hataraku Jid?sha>, the court ruled on the act of including
the photograph of the municipal bus in a book. The bus in question had a painting art work on the body of the
bus and the infringement of the painting artwork was alleged. The court utilised the Japanese Copyright Law art.
46 that provides copyright exception to the use of the work that is constantly displayed in the open and accessible
outdoors, and denied the copyright infringement of the painting work. For the commentaries, see Maiko Murai,
Access-kan?na Chosakubutsu ni taisuru K?sh? no Riy? no Jiy? [Freedom of Use in the Publicly Accessible Copyrighted Work],
10 Intell. Prop. L. & Pol’y J. 247 (2006). See also Toshiaki Iimura, Chosakuken Shingaisosh? no Jitsumu [The Practice
of Copyright Infringement Litigation], in CHOSAKUKEN SEIDO GAISETSU OYOBI ONGAKU CHOSAKUKEN [COPYRIGHT
SYSTEM AND MUSIC COPYRIGHT RIGHT] 207, 211-212 (Meiji Univ. Law Sch. ed., 2006).
60 Tamura, supra note 28.
61 To deal with the bias in the policy making process, the correction is expected not only by the judiciary
but also through the governance of the policy making process on the intellectual property so that the interests of
the minorities - users and the developing countries is reflected in this process. This governance approach is
exemplified by cooperation among the developing countries patent offices. See Peter Drahos, Trust me: Patent
offices in developing countries, (Austl. Nat’l U. CGKD Working Paper, Nov. 2007), available at
http://cgkd.anu.edu.au/menus/workingpapers.php. Another governance based approach is NGO based movement
such as creative commons. See CREATIVE COMMONS - DIGITAL JIDAI NO CHITEKIZAISANKEN [CREATIVE
COMMONS – INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN DIGITAL AGE] (Creative Commons Japan ed., 2005).
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the  applicant  is  entitled  to  a  right,  as  long  as  the  application  meets  the  patentability
requirement) of a patent right and patentability.62 If this “entitlement” view is held as an anti-
these of the view that a patent right is a sovereign privilege based on the discretion of a king,
this  is  a  correct  description  of  the  current  Japanese  patent  law  as  it  does  not  allow  arbitrary
operation. However, as argued in the above on the intellectual property rights in general, and as
clearly exemplified by the changes with product patents, in particular,63 patent right is clearly
not a natural right, but an instrumentalist right based on an industrial policy, for a purpose of
encouraging technological creations and the utilization. In addition, it is indubitable that the
patent office as an expert organization is better equipped to decide which types of technology
should be granted with patent rights, than the courts. It is needless to say that under the
sovereignty of the people, the discretion of the patent office need to be bound by the law.
However, it would be erroneous to think that there is no discretion whatsoever for the patent
office, (i.e. the concept of non-discretionary administrative acts in the administrative law) in
relation to the courts, in case where there is a difference between the interpretation of the text
of law.
This  is  most  visible  in  the  new subject  matter  area  where  there  is  lack  of  (at  least  temporary)
international consensus, such as computer program and biotechnology. For example, the
examination guideline of the Japanese patent office on computer program related inventions
has been through many revisions, and the court does not scrutinize every revision.64 In this
context, the most recent revised examination guideline on computer software related invention
was adopted on Dec. 28th 2000 (H12), but it was inapplicable to the application filed before the
Jan.10th 2001 (H13). Confusion may occur, when the courts examine individual cases. An
arbitrary or non- transparent change in the operation would be against the egalitarianism and
deprive an opportunity of administrative governance by the people. However, examination
guidelines are revised through coherent and transparent process. One may argue that the courts
need to respect the discretion of the patent office through this type of operational changes.65
62 See  1  NOBUHIRO NAKAYAMA, K?GY?SHOY?KEN H? [INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY LAW] 60-61 (2d appended
ed., 2000), where the entitlement perspective is used in contrast to the discretionary grant of patent as a
favouritism sovereign. But it is not clear whether this entitlement perspective denies any discretion of the patent
office.
63 In Japan, patent law allowed only the process invention claims even when the invention was for the new
chemical substances, out of the concern for domestic industry. This has changed when Japanese chemical
technology reached an internationally advanced level and the patent law revision of the 1975 introduced a product
patent over chemical substances.
64 On the historical changes in Japanese patent examination guidelines, see KAZUHIKO TAKEDA, TOKKYO NO
CHISHIKI [KNOWLEDGE ON PATENT] 31-41 (8th ed., 2006).
65 See Tamura, supra note 14, at 131-132.
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Traditional “Rechtstaat” model relies on the “laws” that gives a binding authority to a
legislative decision at a specific time, and at the same time subjects it to a full judicial review,
and thereby provide a one-track governance model to administration. However, it is
questionable whether this one track model can be applied uniformly to the administration of
industrial and technological policies. This is because industrial policy regulates economic
matters that constantly change that create relevant knowledge at every turn. Similarly,
technological policy regulates subject matters which are understood, differently at different
times, such as computer programs and biotechnology. In these cases, it is necessary to propose
an interactive model to divide the competence and function of the legislative, the
administrative, the judiciary or other institutions. An interactive mode would follow the axis
of time that feed the changes in the subject matter back to the substance of regulation66 and
at the same time would utilise the knowledge that the administration has gained over time, to
influence the judiciary, and not just simply prioritise the judiciary between the law (judiciary)
and the administration.
3.4 Governance of the Process by Consequentialist Approach
So far, I have argued that ultimately, a political responsibility has to be relied on, as a complete
analysis and verification of efficiency is difficult, and that in case where there is a structural bias
in the policy making process, the emphasis on the political responsibility would lead to a fine
tuning by the judiciary. However, a just intellectual property institution cannot be constructed
by the means suggested in the above.
To a degree that is possible, it is desirable to clarify the types of institution would improve or
would not improve the efficiency, so that a framework can be set to discourage inefficient policy
decisions. In addition to this, the scope of freedom that must be ensured by the legislation or
the judiciary has to be clearly presented. As concrete examples of this consequentialist exercise,
we examine two theories - a policy lever theory in the context of patent institution and policy
and third wave theory in the context of copyright law.
3.4.1 Theory of Patent Policy Levers67
A patent institution has three functions. First it promotes inventions and its disclosure and
secondly, by early grant of patent rights, it prevents duplicative investments on the inventive
66 See for an risk administration model with the example of environmental policy, Ry?ji Yamamoto, Risk-
Gy?sei no Tetsuzukitekik?z? [A  procedural  structure  of  risk  management], in KANKY? TO SEIMEI [ENVIRONMENT AND
LIFE] 3, 9-15 (Hideaki Shiroyama & Ry?ji Yamamoto eds., 2005).
67 Burk & Lemley, supra note 19.
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activities, and thirdly this early grant promotes commercialisation of the products that are
related to the particular patent.
All of these functions are related to efficiency. However, the patent problem ultimately relates
to the question of the rights and obligations of the two interested parties, as it is operated as
judicial norms. Thus this creates a standard that judging a case according to a certain set of rule
would lead to efficiency, in total, even in case where an individual case specific efficiency is
doubted. Several theories generally approach this framework differently.68 For  example,  a
prospect  theory  supports  earlier  patent  grants  to  prevent  rent  seeking  on  the  same  invention
and to provide additional incentivisation of investment for related invention.69 A competitive
innovation theory proposes innovation occurs by high competition, and not by the stagnation
from monopolistic position.70
A cumulative innovation theory explains that there is a need to provide incentives for both
basic patents and improvement patents and thus patent rights need to be granted to both, but
as a default rule, it allows a mutual check and balance. As a result, patent promotes the
transaction, as the parties need to enter into contracts with each other.71 Anti-commons theory
points out that innovation may be prevented by multiple, fragmented, and heterogeneous
patents over one subject matter such as DNA fragment.72 Similarly, when the scope of a patent
protection is too broad, and complex, the patent thickets theory argues that it would lead to a
problem.73
68 Following the categories in Burk & Lemley, supra note 19. For detail, see Tamura, supra note 32. See also
on the co-relation among the prospect theory, competitive innovation theory and cumulative innovation theory,
Noboru Kawahama, Gijutsu Kakushin to Dokusenkinshih? [Innovation and Antimonopoly Law], 20 Nihon Keizaih?
Gakkai Nenp? [Ann. of Japan Ass’n Econ. L.] 50, 51-57 (1999).
69 Kitch, supra note 32. See for criticism, Lee, supra note 35, at 18-20.
70 Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Innovation, in THE RATE AND
DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609 (Richard R. Nelson ed., 1962). This paper put emphasis on the
comparison with other theories and thus used Arrow as understood by Burk & Lemley, supra note 19. For a more
correct understanding of Arrow in Japan, see the introduction by Kawahama, supra note 68, at 51-53.
71 Merges & Nelson, supra note 33.
72 See Heller & Eisenburg, supra note 35. See also the texts accompanying the note 35.
73 Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools and Standard Setting, in 1
INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119 (Adam Jaffee, Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2001). Patent thickets
can be distinguished from the anticommons theory, as pointed out by Burk & Lemley, supra note 19, at 1613. The
patent thicket is used to describe the situation the use is prevented because not only there are multiple right
holders but also the scope of protection is too broad and overlapping. Anticommons problem may be alleviated if
the number of the rights is reduced, but patent thickets cannot be removed by reducing the number of the patents
alone, but also by narrowing the scope of the patent protection.
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At a glance these five theories seem to be conflicting with each other. However, a policy levers
thesis of Burk and Lemley propose that each of these theories applies to different industries and
thus patent policies need a change of gear depending on the field of its application.74
According to Burk and Lemley, the prospect theory is applied to the pharmaceutical industry.
In  this  industry,  acquisition  of  patent  could  lead  to  a  high  profit  and thus  the  probability  of
rent seeking is also very high. In addition, the commercialization of the products after the
patent grant involves large investment costs, such as clinical tests. Furthermore in case of
medicines, one patent is likely to cover one product and the early grant of patents may have less
negative impacts. Thus prospect theory that proposes early grant of patent seems to be
convincing.
The second theory of competitive innovation is applicable to business method patents. Before
the  decision  of  State  Street  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Signature  Financial  Group,  Inc.,  149  F.3d
1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998),75 a business method patent was believed to be ineligible for patent
protection in the USA. In other words, business methods have developed without the patents
and maybe the need to grant patent protection also is also believed to be minimal.
Burk and Lemley apply the third cumulative theory to software industry. At least in Japan, this
may  apply  to  electronics  industry.  Despite  the  fact  that  many  patents  are  granted  in  the
electronics industry, majority of the Japanese electronics companies are homogenous and often
do not rashly enforce their patents, in fear of retaliation. As a result, negotiations for license
agreements are promoted and often they enter into comprehensive cross licensing agreement.76
The anticommons theory and the patent thickets theory are proposed in the context of
biotechnology and semi-conductor industry and in practice, they apply these fields. The
contribution of the Burk and Lemley’s thesis is in noting that as each field is supported by
different theories, and thus an ideal patent institution for each industry is different. Different
industry conditions make it unnecessary to paint a uniform picture of an ideal patent
institution. While the five theories are not conflicting but comprehensively networked, a
desirable policy goal would be to treat each field differently, for example, by utilizing tools such
as non-obviousness standard and scope of protection.77 Further, Burk and Lemley examines the
74 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 19, at 1615-1630.
75 Ry?ta Hirashima, Beikokutokkyoh? ni okeru Hogotaish? no Hen’y? – Iwayuru “Business Method Exception” wo
meguru D?k? ni tsuite [The changes in the patent subject matter in the American Patent Law – Changes surrounding so called
Business method exception], 41 Chizaiken Forum 23 (2000).
76 Yoshiyuki Tamura, H?katsuteki Cross License to Shokumuhatsumei no Hosh?kingaku no Santei [Comprehensive
Cross Licensing and Calculating Compensation for Employee Invention], 2 Intell. Prop. L. & Pol’y J. 1 (2004).
77 See TAKEDA, supra note 62, at 134-136, arguing the terminological difference between the inventive step
and non-obviousness requirement of Japanese Patent Law art. 29.2.
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proper policy making body - whether it is the legislative or the judiciary, suitable for each field
and thus instead of stressing the need to construct a comprehensive rules, they argue a case for
an individual case specific examination. Moreover, they highlight the role of the judiciary as it is
more resilient against the lobbying. This insight is highly useful as it connects the policy making
process and the framework of legal institution.
The legislation has the problem of bias in the policy making process.78 On the other hand the
judiciary as recommended by Burk and Lemley is indifferent to lobbying, to a certain degree.
However, considering the limitation of the judiciary in collecting necessary information to form
policies and the relative weakness in terms of democratic legitimacy, at least in Japan, policy
making by a third alternative organisation of the administration, the patent office, can be
considered. Indeed, the Patent Office has various patent examiners who are specialised in their
field, and as a practice, they apply patent law to each technological field and in particular, some
of these technologically specific standards of review are informed to the public in the form of
examination guideline.79 As argued in the above 3.3.3, this emphasis on the role of patent office
necessarily adjusts the traditional Rechtstaat model (rule of law) based on the full review of the
judiciary on the examination guidelines.
3.4.2 The third wave theory of copyright80
In terms of copyright, occasional arguments that regard the right against copying as the
permanent  golden rule  are  still  observed.  However,  as  a  copyright  is  a  right  that  is  created  in
response to the technological and societal changes and it needs to be changed according to the
changes in time as well.81
The origin of the contemporary copyright laws dates back to the English law around the early
18th century. Historically, this is the time when the publishing industry bloomed together with
the distribution of type-printing technology. This increased competitions on the books that
contain the same materials, and as a result, it became difficult to recoup the cost of investment
on this  technology.  It  is  generally  believed that from this,  the need to prevent the decrease in
78 In fact, TRIPs art 27.1 is a product of lobbying that requires members not to discriminate on the
technological field. See on the negotiating history UNCTAD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT,
368-374 (2005).
79 For example, JPO’s guidelines on inventions related to computer programs, biotechnology, and
mmedicines. See, JPO, Examination Guidelines for Patent and Utility Model in Japan, Part 7.
80 Tamura, supra note 4.
81 NAKAYAMA, supra note 52, at 241, 272.
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the publication combined with the need to protect an author’s interest has lead to the birth of
modern copyright institution.82
The copyright law that has emerged together with the distribution of printing technology still
focus on the right to prevent copying and added restrictions on the act of public uses.83 This
structure of right focusing on the right to prevent copying may have less impact on the personal
freedom at the time when the copying technology was not distributed to the personal level and
thus when the right regulated only the public arena (as opposed private domain)84 However, in
the late 20th century, audiovisual recording and reproduction technology have reached the
private domain and as a result the copyright right framework seems to excessively restrict
freedom of individuals, and its efficacy has been questioned.
The significance of the copyright institution of these technologies allows us to call the
distribution of the printing technology as the first wave, and the distribution of copyright
technology to a private domain as the second wave. In responses to these technologies,
copyright law started to introduce complementary measures such as rental rights and
remuneration right as against private audio-visual recording, while still maintaining copy-
prevention  centric  view  of  right.  If  one  takes  this  copy  prevention  as  a  golden  rule,  at  an
extreme, all copying becomes wrong. However, when copying (reproduction) is easily done and
the quality of a copy is not different from the original, this expands potentials to enrich human
life. The institution of law should not keep the enjoyment of the technological progress in
shackles, simply because the law is the way it is. A more liberal idea, not confined to the copy-
prevention centric view, needs to be employed when considering a long-term legislative
theory.85
However, the age of the Internet brought new challenges that are qualitatively different from
those of the second (which is not yet resolved); on the premises of copyright law, and this is the
82 See HIDEAKI SHIRATA, COPYRIGHT NO SHITEKITENKAI [HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF COPYRIGHT]
(1998).
83 TAMURA, supra note 30, at 108-111.
84 See also Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 Or. L. Rev. 19, 36-37, 48
(1996), arguing copyright law did not regulate non-commercial user and non-institutional user. See also JESSICA
LITMAN, supra note 19, at 18-19, 177-178.
85 For example, arguing a case for copyright registry as a condition for protection against digital use, see
Yoshiyuki Tamura, Digital-ka Jidai no Chitekizaisanh?seido [Intellectual Property Law in Digital Age], in
KIN?TEKI CHITEKIZAISAN H? NO RIRON [FUNCTIONAL THEORY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY], supra note 43, at
183.  See  also  JESSICA LITMAN, supra note 19, at 180-182, arguing that the copyright infringement should be
found only in the large scale commercial uses that deprive the right holder of the economic opportunity and that
the standard should be found in the common-law or court based concretization of the standard to delineate the
commercial use from other uses (see also suggests introduction of social norms by the jury trials). Litman also
argues that it is difficult to to demand the general public who does not participate in the policy-making process
of copyright law to follow the law that is only understandable by the copyright law experts.
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third wave of changes. In other words, as the distribution of communication technology enables
information communication networks, in addition to the copying technology, anybody can
make information publicly available. This unifies the public arena with the private domain and
it  becomes  difficult  to  distinguish  them.  In  this  context,  not  just  the  copy  prevention  centric
view,  but  also  the  use  in  the  “public”  sphere  also  has  to  be  used  as  a  device  to  prevent  the
excessive intervention in the private person’s freedom.
Additionally, further defence systems are being constructed such as copy protection technology
and technological management against public transmission, and click-on contracting. These
additional means should be viewed as an intermediate step to facilitate the recoupment of the
right holder’s interests and need to be accompanied by the distribution of circumventing
technology and the levy system. Otherwise, several types of technological protection would
make  a  copyright  system a  means  to  simply  protect  the  vested  interests  of  the  old  technology
media that have distributed the copyrighted work. This may deprive the society, to more
precisely, private members of the society, of the benefits from the widespread diffusion of copy
and communication technology.86 In  this  sense,  what  is  called  for  the  copyright  law  is  a
paradigm shift from the copy-prevention centric view toward a combined perspective of copy-
prevention and regulation of the general use in the public sphere.
Originally,  as  is  the  case  in  other  types  of  intellectual  property  right,  the  justification  of  a
copyright is based on two conflicting theories and the paradigm shift proposed in this paper
may be criticised as being only based on the incentive based theory. However, even if one
adopts a natural right based theory, it is fundamentally questionable that the proposition of
“creation”  (i.e.  that  a  person creates  something)  can  be  used  as  a  ground to  change  back  the
society toward the direction before the development of new technologies.
86 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0, 169-199 (2006), for a warning that the technological access
and copy control in the cyberspace unsettles the traditional balance of protection and the public, and calling for a
creation e.g. by law of a certain incompleteness in cyberspace. See also, Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use
Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems, 15 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 41 (2001), suggesting a concrete proposal for a
framework that systematic and technical provision of fair-use, accompanying the technological protection. See, for
the formation and validity of click-on type contracts, Sono Hiroo, J?h?keiyaku ni okeru Jiy? to  K?jo [Copyright
Takeover: The Expansion of Contract under UCITA], 1999 Americah? 181, 192 (2000). See also Hiroo Sono, Keiyaku
to  Gijutu  ni  yoru  Chosakuken  no  Kakuch? ni kansuru Nihonh? no  J?ky? [Dealing with Contractual and Technological
Expansion of Copyright Under Japanese Law],  3 Intell.  Prop. L. & Pol’y J.  185 (2004), arguing that the mass market
contract and the individual negotiation cannot be the same. See also, a balancing these two views, TAMURA, supra
note 14, at 427-428, 433-434.




A  theory  of  intellectual  property  law  and  policy  that  this  paper  proposed  so  far  can  be
summarised as following five arguments:
a. As long as intellectual property right is a freedom inhibiting regulation, it is difficult to
justify its foundation based on the labour-base property theory or theory of personhood. The
foundation then should be based on the efficiency gain from the provision of efficiency.
b. On the other hand, efficiency is difficult to assess and the trade offs between efficiency
and the freedom become questioned. As the verification of the efficiency gains is difficult, the
justification ultimately depends on the legitimization of the process based on political
responsibility through democratic decision making.
c. However, the policy-making process is structurally biased. It easily reflects the organized
and aggregated interests of large companies, but neglects the interests of the disaggregated
private individuals. This leads to excessive strengthening of the intellectual property rights.
d. In this context, it is necessary to ensure the legitimacy of the process by utilizing the role
of the judiciary that fine tunes the law to ensure individual freedom, while seeking a governing
mechanism to correct the bias in the policy making process as much as possible.87
e. If possible it is desirable to clarify the types of institution would improve or would not
improve the efficiency. In addition, by adopting a consequentialist theory, the scope of
fundamental freedom that must be ensured by the legislation or the judiciary may become
clarified.  This  should  reduce  a  grey  area  and narrows  the  room for  discretion  in  the  decision
making process.
Finally,  I  would like to add the area where the theory proposed in the above may be applied.
The theory outlined in the above is based on the premise that it is socially desirable to view the
active justification for intellectual property law regulation to be based on the promotion of
creative production and its distribution.88
Thus, as stated several times in the above, it s believed that there is a democratic consensus that
the Japanese domestic law incorporate these premises supporting each intellectual property
laws. Intellectual property right inhibits others’ freedom to use without physical and
geographical limits, and the MNEs activities tend to expand the rights internationally. In this
87 See supra text accompanying note 61.
88 Ko Hasegawa, Ky???tekihan’ei to Chitekizaisanh?genri [‘Competitive Flourishing’ and the Principles
of Intellectual Property Law], 3 Intell. Prop. L. & Pol’y J. 17, 17-25 (2004).
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sense, a theory suitable for one domestic law should not be applied to all intellectual property
laws in general. In addition, incentive theory is premised on the vision of a society that reached
a threshold of a certain level of economic development that could prosper through
competition. Thus this may be inapplicable to a society with different degree of maturity in
economic development.89 However, the process oriented theory may be even more suitable to
be  applied  to  the  international  community  where  the  conflict  of  interests  is  visibly  stronger.
Thus  a  clarification  of  a  consequentialist  governance  theory  may  be  called  for,  while  seeking
legitimacy in policy making process, and acknowledging the bias in the international
intellectual property policy making process.
Typical examples of non universal applicability of incentive theory are the international debates
surrounding the traditional knowledge and the genetic resources. As widely known, there is a
strong tension between the developed country and the less developed and developing countries
that are endowed with traditional knowledge and genetic resources.90 Traditional knowledge
can be approached from a cultural pluralistic perspective.91 The friction stems from the tension
between the IP system based on the culture of developed country that is dynamic, industrial,
and individualistic against the gradual, ecological and communitarian protection of traditional
knowledge.92 Furthermore, the question of protecting traditional knowledge and genetic
resources is related to ecosystem and thus cannot be discussed without discussing the policy and
value choices between prioritising the industrial development or biodiversity and
environmental protection.93
When one considers the differences in the culture and value system, consequentialism cannot
be applied at all. Ultimately, a process oriented solutions such as international treaty
89 Id. at 24, 30.
90 VANDANA SHIVA,  PROTECT OR PLUNDER? - UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2001),
See for a theoretical review, Yoshiyuki Tamura, Dent?tekichishiki to Idenshigen no Hogo no Konkyo to
Chitekizaisanh?seido: Sairon [Revisiting the Normative Foundations of Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Genetic
Resources], 19 Intell. Prop. L. & Pol’y J. 157 (2008); Yoshiyuki Tamura, Dent?tekichishiki to Idenshigen no Hogo no
Konkyo to Chitekizaisanh?seido [Normative Foundation of Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Genetic Resources], 13
Intell. Prop. L. & Pol’y J. 53 (2006).
91 See WILL KYMLICKA,  CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION Ch. 8 (2nd ed.,
2002).
92 Ko Hasegawa, Senj?min no Chitekizaisanhogo ni okeru Tetsugakutekibunmyaku [The Philosophical
context of the intellectual property protections for indigenous people], 13 Intell. Prop. L. & Pol’y J. 27 (2006).
See also BOYLE, supra note  37,  at  128-130.  They  suggest  that  there  is  need  to  share  or  return  profits  to  the
indigenous people to preserve biodiversity and the nature. In particular, the Bellagio Declaration similarly critics
the vision of creatorship in the current intellectual property and calls for a special neighboring rights to protect
the traditional knowledge. See BOYLE, supra, at 192-200.
93 Shiva, supra note 90.
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negotiation has to be adopted, and ensuring the legitimacy of the process becomes crucial.94 In
this case, even if it is not possible to adopt a natural right based conclusion that the traditional
knowledge and genetic resources should be protected as such, it is equally erroneous to argue
that their protection is outside the scope of intellectual property, simply because they do not fit
to the current shape of intellectual property law system of developed countries.95
94 See also Yuka Aoyagi, Dent?tekichishiki ni kansuru H?seibi eno Senj?min oyobi Chiikiky???tai no
Sanka ni tsuite [Participation of Indigenous and Local Communities to the Development of Legal Systems on
Traditional Knowledge, Genetic Resources and Folklore], 8 Intell. Prop. L. & Pol’y J. 95 (2005).
95 Tamura, Sairon [Revisiting], supra note 90.
